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Fatou Bensouda remembers being a strong proponent of human 
rights even at a young age in her hometown in Gambia.1  From a 
formative age and throughout her life, she has followed a path 
always leading toward justice.2  Elected as deputy prosecutor at 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2004, Bensouda was 
then elected as the first female prosecutor at the ICC in 2011.3  
In her role as Prosecutor for the ICC Bensouda is responsible 
for determining cases that should be heard before the Court, 
gathering facts from the States concerned in the matter, and 
helping to determine whether the Office should proceed with 
 
1 See David Pilling, Fatou Bensouda: ‘It’s about the law. It’s 
not about power,’ FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/beeb8dba-ce3c-4a33-b319-3fcff0916736 
(recalling that at age eleven, Bensouda’s response to domestic 
abuse was “even at that age, I would say ‘No. That is wrong.’”). 
2 See e.g., id. (discussing Bensouda’s advocacy for women in 
abusive households in her home village and her advisory role 
within the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).  
3 See e.g., id. (detailing Bensouda’s legal background in private 
practice and her public interest work with the UN and the ICC). 
 
2 
investigations.4  These investigatory actions involve a multi-
phase process where each phase may result in the case being 
dismissed and not proceeding to trial.5  To pass even the 
preliminary phases, it must be shown that the ICC has 
jurisdiction to hear the case.6   
In April 2020 the ICC reauthorized an investigation into 
alleged acts of torture, cruel treatment, and other war crimes 
committed by the United States in Afghanistan.7  As a result of 
 
4 See The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary 
Examination Activities 2020,INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1, 3 (2020), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2020-PE/2020-pe-report-
eng.pdf (describing the multi-phase process of proceeding with a 
case within the ICC as hinging on consideration of jurisdiction, 
admissibility, and the interests of justice).  
5 See id. at 68 (detailing that Ukraine has been under 
preliminary examination for over six years - since April 2014). 
6 See id. at 3 (listing two elements of establishing jurisdiction 
as (i) temporal jurisdiction (whether the action took place 
after the Rome Statute came into force) and (ii) either 
territorial or personal jurisdiction (whether the crime was 
committed on the territory or by a national of a State Party)). 




the renewed investigation into these alleged war crimes, former 
President Trump declared a national emergency and authorized 
imposition of sanctions against anyone found to be supporting 
the ICC’s investigation.8  The Trump administration believed the 
investigations constituted a direct attack on the safety of 
United States citizens who may be implicated in the proceedings.9  
Although Bensouda stated that as Prosecutor for the ICC, she 
approaches all of her cases with the mindset that no matter who 
the defendant is, “it’s about the law. It’s not about the 
power[,]” the Trump administration believed her actions were a 
 
Crimes Inquiry, The Guardian (Mar. 5, 2020 5:04 AM) 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/mar/05/senior-icc-judges-
authorise-afghanistan-war-crimes-inquiry (announcing that ICC 
judges overturned a cessation of inquiries and reauthorized 
investigation of CIA black sites and activities in Afghanistan).  
8 See Exec. Order No. 13928, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,139, 36,139 (June 
11, 2020) [hereinafter E.O. 13928] (declaring a national 
emergency due to the ICC’s “illegitimate” claim of jurisdiction 
over and investigation into the U.S.’s actions in Afghanistan). 
9 See e.g., Remarks to the Press, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of 
State (June 11, 2020) (on file with author) (painting a mental 
image of a U.S. citizen being imprisoned in a foreign prison 
during vacation as a result of the ICC’s investigations). 
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threat to national security.10  Due to her continued work for the 
ICC, the United States State Department placed Bensouda and 
another prominent ICC figure on the Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”).11  As a 
result of this designation any assets Bensouda possessed in the 
United States or that fell under the jurisdiction of the United 
States were blocked (i.e. frozen), and she was prohibited from 
accessing them.12  Further, due to the nature of the designation, 
 
10 See David Pilling, supra note 1 (demonstrating Bensouda’s 
commitment to justice and her unwillingness to be intimidated). 
11 See Press Statement, Michael P. Pompeo, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of State, Actions to Protect U.S. Personnel From 
Illegitimate Investigation by the International Criminal Court 
(Sept. 2, 2020) (on file with author) (announcing Bensouda and 
Mochochoko’s blocking from support of U.S. Persons because of 
their involvement with ICC investigations into U.S. personnel). 
12 See E.O. 13928, supra note 8 (prohibiting the making of 
contributions in funds, goods, or services to designated 
individuals directly or indirectly); see also Specially 






U.S. Persons who supported Bensouda directly or indirectly 
through monetary transactions or professional support were 
exposed to potential liability.13   
Bensouda is only one individual on the SDN List though; the 
power of the President to enact similar restrictions on 
individuals, countries, or organizations is vested by the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).14  Under the 
same executive order (E.O.). that authorized the designation of 
Bensouda on the SDN List, Phakiso Mochochoko – the Head of the 
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division of the 
 
list-sdn-human-readable-lists [hereafter SDN List] (explaining 
that when someone is designated to the SDN List all assets 
obtained via the United States will be blocked automatically). 
13 See Exec. Order No. 13928 supra note 8 at §3(a)-(b) 
(reiterating that direct and indirect support of designated 
individuals or the receiving of direct or indirect support from 
a designated individual is prohibited for all U.S. persons). 
14 Accord Adam Szubin, Sanctions 101, Part I of II: A Powerful 
Financial Tool, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (May 30, 2014) (granting the 
President, under IEEPA, the power to declare national 
emergencies and impose financial sanctions in response to 
subjectively categorized national security threats). 
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ICC - was designated.15   These two human rights activists are 
listed alongside known terrorists,16 narcotics traffickers,17 and 
other parties affiliated with sanctioned countries.18  Since 
1990, Presidents have declared multiple new national emergencies 
each year and reaffirmed existing emergencies, resulting in the 
average national emergency under IEEPA lasting nearly a decade 
with more than thirty concurrent IEEPA sanctions programs active 
at the time of writing this Comment.19   
 
15 See Press Release, Secretary of State, supra note 11 
(announcing Bensouda and Mochochoko’s designation under the ICC 
sanctions regime for supporting investigating U.S. personnel). 
16 See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 
25, 2001) [hereinafter E.O. 13224] (designating multiple parties 
who are known associates of terrorist organizations). 
17 See e.g., Foreign Narcotics Designation Act, Letter Reporting 
on Sanctions, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1262 (June 1, 2000) 
(announcing twelve individuals to be sanctioned pursuant to 
§804(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act).  
18 See Adam Szubin, supra note 14 (explaining that OFAC draws on 
public and private information when making designations). 
19 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45618, 




This Comment argues that IEEPA has granted the President of 
the United States too much unilateral power to determine the 
course of global economic interactions and individuals’ access 
to resources, and that this power should be limited by the 
judiciary by expanding the use of First Amendment protections 
for those who face liability resulting from interactions with 
parties on the SDN List.20  Part II describes the statutory 
history of IEEPA, the use of presidential power granted by IEEPA 
to determine the course of United States foreign affairs and 
political relationships, and the case law precedent surrounding 
First Amendment constitutional challenges to IEEPA.21  Part III 
argues that the current use of IEEPA allows the President to 
violate the First Amendment and Congress’s intent in drafting 
 
(2020) (reporting that 1.5 new national emergencies are declared 
and an average of 4.5 E.O.’s citing IEEPA are issued per year). 
20 See infra Part III and IV (arguing that the Judiciary can 
limit the President’s power under IEEPA by using a modified 
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny test to protect global 
citizens from the unilateral influence of one individual). 
21 See infra Part II (establishing the procedural history of 
IEEPA and related statutes, the resulting lack of controls put 
on the President, a summary of First Amendment challenges to 
IEEPA, and historically used intermediate scrutiny tests). 
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and amending IEEPA, and proposes a new test to be employed by 
the judiciary to protect First Amendment rights in IEEPA cases.22  
Part IV recommends that First Amendment rights create a weighty 
and important policy compelling federal courts to use their 
interpretation power to constrain the President’s actions under 
IEEPA, and argues that the judiciary exercising this power 
allows for free speech protection in the absence of a 
Congressional amendment to IEEPA passing.23  Part V concludes by 
reiterating that sanctions have a distinct purpose and IEEPA has 
historically allowed the President to go beyond this purpose and 
hold too broad of unilateral power, and thus should be 
constrained in the interest of First Amendment rights.24 
 
22 See infra Part III (asserting that the current use of IEEPA by 
the President violates the legislative intent of the statute and 
proposing a modified intermediate scrutiny test to protect First 
Amendment freedom of speech from undue restrictions). 
23 See infra Part IV (recommending that the protection of First 
Amendment rights is crucial for the courts to uphold and 
asserting that this is within the court’s power and in the best 
interest of justice for courts to limit IEEPA power in the 
absence of congress amending IEEPA). 






A. History of IEEPA 
 
Economic sanctions are used by the United States as a 
strategic mechanism to alter the behaviors and decisions of 
state and nonstate actors that threaten the security of the 
United States or its interests.25  Currently the primary 
authority for enacting economic sanctions is IEEPA, but IEEPA’s 
predecessor - that authorized many of the same actions - was the 
Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).26  TWEA was enacted by 
Congress, in part, to grant the President broad power to take 
control of private property for public use during times of war.27  
 
under IEEPA are ultimately harmful to American citizens and the 
global economy and must be constrained). 
25 See Perry S. Bechky, Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries of 
International Economic Law, 83 MO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) (positing 
that economic sanctions are political and economic tools used by 
powerful governments to influence other nations). 
26 See H.R. REP. NO 95-459, at 2 (1977) (detailing that IEEPA 
adopts many of the powers from TWEA, but not all). 
27 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, supra note 19at 5-6 (stating that 
TWEA granted the executive control over international trade, 
investment, migration, and communications between the United 
States and its enemies). 
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In the 1970s Congress formed a bipartisan commission to 
reevaluate the necessity and extent of power granted to the 
President under TWEA after realizing that the United States was 
under a continuous state of national emergency for over three 
decades.28  As a result of the findings of this commission, 
Congress moved to reform the emergency powers under TWEA by 
first enacting the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and 
IEEPA shortly thereafter.29  As a strategy to constrain the 
executive’s unilateral power, IEEPA was to confer specific 
powers to the President in times of national emergencies that 
narrowed the scope of TWEA and imposed more oversight via 




28 See id. at 6-7, n.45 (stating that the Special Committee 
reevaluated the delegation of emergency authority to the 
President and concluded that “the United States had technically 
‘been in a state of national emergency since March 9, 1933’”). 
29 See id. at 8-9 (explaining that the NEA gives power to IEEPA 
and the purpose of enacting IEEPA was to create more oversight 
for the President and limit certain powers to emergencies).  
30 See id. at 7 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-459 (1977)) (acknowledging 
that Congress was worried TWEA granted the President too great 
of unilateral power). 
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i.  Statutory Limitations on IEEPA Powers, Namely 
the Berman Amendment. 
 
A number of items are categorically exempted from 
presidential influence under IEEPA: namely humanitarian aid, 
travel and travel related activities, exchange of informational 
material, and personal communications.31  These exemptions serve 
as the primary limitations on the President’s use of IEEPA 
because Congress’s oversight power requires a veto-proof 
majority to overturn the President’s actions under IEEPA.32  Many 
of the exceptions existed in the original drafting of IEEPA but 
as the result of a later amendment - commonly known as the 
Berman Amendment or informational materials exemption - IEEPA 
also protects the exchange of informational material.33   
 
31 See also 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1)-(4) (excepting personal 
communication, certain donations, exportation of informational 
materials, and travel related transactions as the only statutory 
restrictions on presidential sanction power). 
32 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that a 
veto provision is unconstitutional if it allows one House of 
Congress to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch). 
33 See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3) (amending the IEEPA to protect 
exchange of “information or informational materials” and 
including a non-exhaustive list of examples). 
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The Berman Amendment was legislated in response to worries 
that the President had too much power to infringe on 
constitutional rights with the breadth of economic sanctions.34  
The text reads, in part, “[t]he authority granted to the 
President by this section does not include the authority to 
regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly . . . the 
importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, 
. . . of any information or informational materials” and goes on 
to enumerate a non-exhaustive list of items that are protected.35  
The Amendment was adopted in 1979 and risked becoming obsolete 
in an age of technology if not for the key phrase “included but 
not limited to,” that gave courts the power to maintain the 
Amendment’s relevance.36  On the plain language of the Amendment, 
 
34 See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R. 
7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (believing that TWEA must be reformed 
because the statute granted the President “dictatorial powers”). 
35 See 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3) (“including but not limited to, 
publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, 
microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, 
and news wire feeds”). 




it applies to imports and exports from countries, but does not 
specify how the exception should be applied when individuals or 
organizations are sanctioned.37  Courts have disregarded this 
plain reading of the Amendment in many cases and opted to read 
the text without consideration for the word “country” as a 
defining aspect.38  For example, following Donald Trump’s 
declaration of a national emergency and attempt to impose 
sanctions on TikTok, the court in Marland v. Trump held that the 
videos created and distributed on the social media platform 
constitute informational material that are protected by the 
 
(S.D. Fla, 1989) (holding that although art is not enumerated 
artwork falls under the “and other informational materials” 
classification and is protected by the Berman Amendment 
regardless of alleged propagandic content). 
37 Compare 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(3) (specifying it relates to 
importation and exportation of information to countries) with 50 
U.S.C. §1702(b)(2) (lacking reference to country or territory). 
38 See e.g., Marland v. Trump, No. 20-4597, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
202572, at *23 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 20, 2020) (stating that the 
TikTok prohibition indirectly regulates the exchange of 
informational materials on the web application).  
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Berman Amendment.39  This interpretive move has allowed courts to 
maintain the Amendment’s relevance in an era of globally 
reaching technology.40   
 
ii. Presidential Powers and Procedure Under IEEPA 
 
Under IEEPA, the President’s powers may only be exercised 
“to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat” that 
originates outside of the United States but nevertheless has a 
substantial impact on “the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy.”41  If the President perceives and declares such a 
national emergency, they may then act pursuant to the procedure 
in the NEA and promulgate sanctions using IEEPA.42  Once the 
 
39 See id. at *25 (finding that the sanctions against TikTok 
would have the effect of preventing the exchange of 
informational materials created and posted to the app). 
40 See id. at *20 (finding that videos on TikTok are protected 
because they are analogous to artwork, photographs, and films). 
41 See 50 U.S.C § 1701 (stating that IEEPA may be applied to any 
unusual and extraordinary threat with minimal limitation on the 
subjectively perceived threat). 
42 See National Emergencies Act, 94 Pub. L. 412, 90 Stat. 1255 
(1976) (conferring power to IEEPA as a statute that may 




President has declared a national emergency and created a 
sanctions structure under IEEPA, they must immediately report to 
Congress specifying (1) the circumstances that necessitate the 
exercise of their IEEPA authority; (2) why they believe the 
situation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States; (3) the specific authorities to be exercised and actions 
planned; (4) why they believe those actions are necessary; and 
(5) any foreign countries against which actions are to be taken 
including why those actions are necessary.43  This process is 
typically accomplished through the use of a Presidential E.O. 
that is published in the Federal Register stating that there is 
an extraordinary and unusual threat that must be neutralized or 
addressed.44  IEEPA further requires the President to consult 
 
President’s use by Congress). 
43 See 50 U.S.C. § 1703(b) (directing the President to notify 
Congress, within a short period of time, of any subjective 
reasons for declaring a national emergency). 
44 See Ari Shapiro, What a President Can Do Under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, NPR ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (May 31, 2019) https://www.npr.org/2019/05/31/728754901 
(maintaining that the President need only issue an E.O. with the 
magic words “extraordinary and unusual threat”). 
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with Congress “in every possible instance” before exercising 
IEEPA authorities.45  Under the NEA an emergency declared by the 
President under IEEPA may only be terminated by the President, a 
resolution of Congress with a veto-proof majority, or if the 
President does not follow proper procedure in continuing the 
properly publish notice of continuation of the emergency.46   
 
iii. Office of Foreign Asset Control Implementation 
Power 
 
As the statute currently stands, the President has the 
power - after the proper procedure is effectuated - to freeze 
assets of foreign individuals, organizations, or countries 
deemed to fall under the national emergency.47  This is not an 
 
45 See, 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (codifying the requirement that 
Congress be consulted “whenever possible” without specifying the 
subject matter or form of the consultation). 
46 See 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (mandating that a declaration of 
continued emergency must be published ninety days prior to its 
annual anniversary to continue the emergency for the next year, 
but if this is not done a new emergency may be declared 
regarding the same event). 
47 See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (granting Presidents the power to 
investigate and block individuals as necessary within the 
economic sanctions and international trade regimes). 
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action that the President themselves generally perform though, 
this enforcement power is delegated by the President to the 
Department of Treasury and its Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC).48  Because the President and OFAC do not typically have 
jurisdiction or power to directly control the foreign threat 
identified, the focus of enforcement is on transactions within 
the United States and on U.S. Persons, wherever located.49  These 
controls are actualized as prohibitions, rules, and licenses 
published by the Department of Treasury in the Code of Federal 
Regulations and on OFAC’s website that must be complied with by 
all U.S. Persons and other persons subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction.50  When OFAC determines a person meets certain 
criteria articulated in a sanctions program, OFAC “designates” 
 
48 See S. REP. NO. 110-82, at 1-2 (2007) (detailing the 
President’s power to propose the imposition of economic 
sanctions and OFAC’s designated duty to be administrator and 
enforcer of sanctions related activity). 
49 See 31 C.F.R. §560.314 (2021) (defining U.S. persons as a U.S. 
citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under U.S. 
law, or any person physically located in the United States). 
50 See e.g., 31 C.F.R. §560.201 (specifying OFAC’s regulations 
prohibiting the importation of goods from Iran and obtaining 
power, in part, through the pronouncement of E.O 12613). 
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the person, meaning the person becomes listed on the SDN List 
which is published on OFAC’s website as well as the Federal 
Register.51  The penalty for violating sanctions and dealing with 
blocked persons or countries is multifold and varies from strict 
liability with civil damages to criminal liability enforced by 
the Department of Justice.52  Individuals may be removed from the 
SDN List as the result of a terminated national emergency, a 
successful petition for removal from the SDN list, or as a 
result of other extraordinary circumstances.53   
 
51 See SDN List, supra note 12 (publishing a list of individuals 
determined, by the government, to be acting on behalf of or in 
support of sanctioned governments or activities).  
52 See Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, 86 Fed. 
Reg. 14,534, 14,535 (Mar. 17, 2021) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 
pt. 501) (announcing adjusted civil penalty for IEEPA sanctions 
to be a maximum of $311,532); see also Amber Vitale, et al, OFAC 
Will See You Now, HARV. L. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/02/02/ofac-will-see-you-
now/ (averring that OFAC and DOJ’s separate charging structures 
permit civil and criminal penalties for the same infraction). 
53 See 31 CFR § 501.807 (permitting any designated person to 





B. Current Trends of IEEPA Sanctions 
 
Although IEEPA was initially implemented to constrain 
Presidential emergency authority, IEEPA had the effect of 
expanding the scale, scope, and frequency of Presidential 
emergency authority usage.54  Emergencies under IEEPA have a 
tendency to span longer periods of time compared to those 
declared under TWEA, and consequentially the number of ongoing 
national emergencies has continued to increase almost 
continuously since the enactment of IEEPA.55  For instance, the 
 
insufficient basis for their designation originally), see also 
Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions, 86 Fed. Reg. 22101, 22102 
(Apr. 26, 2021) (removing Bensouda and Mochochoko from the SDN 
List as a result of President Biden’s E.O. terminating the 
national emergency with regards to the ICC).  
54 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, supra note 19 at 8, 17 (reporting 
that over forty-three years Presidents invoked IEEPA in fifty-
nine national emergencies with thirty-three concurrent 
emergencies involving IEEPA active as of July 1, 2020). 
55 Compare id. at 18-19 (stating that the longest standing IEEPA 
sanctions regime was declared in 1979 and is still in effect) 
with FRANK CHURCH AND CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Forward, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 




first national emergency declared under IEEPA was declared in 
1979 and as of March 2021 is still active.56  While all 
emergencies declared under TWEA were geographically tied, under 
IEEPA non-geographically-specific emergencies are declared with 
more frequency.57  Declarations of emergencies in response to 
amorphic non-geographically-specific threats has resulted in 
effectuating broad application of sanctions.58  Sanctions 
programs or regimes are currently in place for threats such as 
the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons59 and 
 
(observing that Presidents used TWEA to keep America under 
national emergencies for sixty-four consecutive years). 
56 See Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to 
Iran, 85 Fed. Reg. 72895, 72895 (Nov. 12, 2020) (reaffirming the 
emergency declared in November 1979 for the forty-second year). 
57 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, supra note 19 at 17 (positing that 
Presidential use of national emergencies expanded in scale, 
scope, and frequency under IEEPA as the successor to TWEA). 
58 See id. (observing that non-geographic IEEPA sanctions 
authorize targeting persons and groups instead of governments). 
59 See Exec. Order. No. 13382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,565 (June 28, 
2005) (designating organizations believed to be proliferating 
weapons of mass destruction). 
 
21 
threats to commit terrorism.60  In addition to these nebulous 
threats, the stated reasons for declaring a national emergency 
allow vague statements to qualify a situation as a national 
emergency thus allowing the President to target organizations, 
groups, or individuals.61  
 
C. Constitutional ties to IEEPA. 
 
When plaintiffs challenge IEEPA on Fifth Amendment grounds 
they generally fail regardless of whether the allegation is of 
an unconstitutional taking, unconstitutional vagueness, or 
otherwise.62  Challenges to IEEPA itself as being 
 
60 See Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 
2001) (blocking the property of persons who commit or support 
terrorism by freezing their assets connected to the U.S.). 
61 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, supra note 19 at 21 (explaining 
that rationales initially included reference to specific 
geography or actions of a government, but rational is now 
vague); see e.g., Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 
(Nov. 14, 1979) (referencing, vaguely, “the situation in Iran” 
as grounds for declaring a national emergency).  
62 See e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 
F.Supp. 2d 57, 78 (D.D.C. 2003) (indicating that assets blocked 




unconstitutional also fail as courts recognize that Congress was 
within its right to grant the President the statutory authority 
and the President is permitted to delegate granted authorities 
to other government agencies.63  The most successful IEEPA 
challenge are First Amendment challenges arguing that IEEPA 
infringes on plaintiff’s freedom of speech.64  
 
i. Grounds for First Amendment Challenges 
 
The text of the First Amendment protects against acts that 
infringe on freedoms of speech, press, peaceful assembly, and 
petition.65  Throughout years of First Amendment caselaw, the 
Supreme Court has expanded First Amendment protections to 
include more activities categorized under the four areas of 
 
because the taking is temporary). 
63 See e.g., United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212–13 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (holding that IEEPA constitutes an appropriate 
delegation of congressional authority to the Executive). 
64 See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 
20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *29 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 
04, 2021) (holding that the IEEPA sanctions chilled a 
significant amount of protected speech activities).  
65 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making laws 
that infringe on the freedom of speech). 
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protection listed in the text.66  To bring a case under the First 
Amendment a plaintiff must have standing, a justiciable claim, 
and establish a challenge on one of two grounds: facial 
challenges and/or as-applied challenges.67  Facial challenges 
arise when Plaintiffs argue that a law should be invalidated 
because the government imposed law, rule, regulation, or policy 
is unconstitutional as written.68  Conversely, an as-applied 
First Amendment challenge arises when Plaintiffs argue that a 
 
66 See e.g., David L. Hudson Jr., Freedom of Association, The 
First Amendment Encyclopedia (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/1594 (explaining that, although not enumerated 
in the First Amendment, the freedom of association is recognized 
by courts as a fundamental right). 
67 See MARY KEENEY & SUSAN G. CONWAY, CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE 
STATUTES AND RULES, 1 (17th ed. 2005) (detailing that cases are 
permissible to bring to court if the Plaintiff has standing 
(real controversy), the question is justiciable (shows a First 
Amendment violation is likely to occur), and the case is ripe 
(the facts show infringement)).  
68 See David L. Hudson Jr., Facial Challenges, The First 
Amendment Encyclopedia (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/954(positing that facial challenges often 
allege that laws are overbroad or vague).  
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government imposed law, rule, regulation, or policy is 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs’ individual 
situation.69  Facial challenges often precede as-applied 
challenges, thus when a Plaintiff does not succeed on their 
facial challenge they may bring and succeed on an as-applied 
challenge.70  Courts have shown a preference for as-applied 
challenges to provide a narrower remedy rather than upholding a 
facial challenge that may overrule the democratic law making 
process.71  Facial and as-applied challenges also result in 
different possibilities of relief: facial challenges seek to 
invalidate an entire government rule whereas an as-applied 
challenge will narrow a government rule’s applicability without 
 
69 See David L. Hudson Jr., As-applied Challenges, The First 
Amendment Encyclopedia (2009), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/892(explaining that as-applied challenges are 
used to avoid premature decisions). 
70 See David L. Hudson Jr., supra note 64 (reporting that courts 
may strike down a facial challenge and subsequently accept an 
as-applied challenge on the same facts). 
71 See David L. Hudson Jr., supra note 65 (stating that courts 
prefer as-applied challenges, but some courts struggle to 
delineate between the categories). 
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abolishing it.72   
 
ii.  First Amendment Challenges to IEEPA Sanctions 
Regimes 
 
Historically, the most successful arguments challenging 
IEEPA sanctions have been First Amendment challenges claiming a 
sanctions regime unduly limits the rights of freedom of speech 
or association.73  Not all of these cases have been successful, 
for example in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Department of 
the Treasury, the court held that IEEPA sanction do not unjustly 
infringe on enough of the Plaintiff’s First Amendment free 
speech to justify granting an injunction.74  Conversely, the 
recent case of Open Society Justice Initiative found that the 
only viable path to grant injunctive relief was under the First 
 
72 See id. (emphasizing that as-applied challenges are preferred 
by the courts over facial challenges to protect the judiciary 
from infringing on executive power). 
73 But see Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 
F.3d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the Government’s 
actions satisfy necessary scrutiny and do not violate 
Plaintiff’s First amendment rights). 
74 See 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1267 (holding that Plaintiffs could 
not prove using extended hypotheticals that the First Amendment 
infringements warranted relief for themselves).  
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Amendment.75  In Open Society, the Plaintiffs consisted of 
numerous dual-citizen American legal scholars who regularly 
worked with the ICC.76  These scholars challenged the 
implementation of E.O. 13928 enacting broad sanctions 
prohibiting “any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or 
services” for any person designated pursuant to the Order.77  The 
Plaintiffs only succeed on the First Amendment claim that the 
E.O. - and following regulations - unjustly prohibited 
Plaintiffs from engaging in certain speech and advocacy in 
support of the ICC, and thus exposed Plaintiffs to civil and 
criminal liability for engaging in constitutionally protected 
 
75 See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121, 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *31 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 04, 2021) 
(holding in favor of the government on Plaintiff’s APA 
challenge, Fifth Amendment challenge, and as-applied First 
Amendment challenge). 
76 See id. at * 11-15 (establishing the Plaintiffs as dual 
citizens of the United States and other countries, plus law 
professors at four different law schools). 
77 See id. at *9 (citing Exec. Order No. 13928, 85 Fed. Reg. 
36,139 (June 11, 2020)) (showing that the language of the 
executive order provided a broad basis for the sanctions regime 
and could encompass a variety of activities and conduct). 
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speech or advocacy.78  Although the Government argued that the 
regulations were content-neutral and/or justified by the 
compelling national security interest, the court found that the 
Plaintiff’s interactions with the ICC would likely qualify as a 
“service” under the sanctions regime and that this limiting 
would be subject to strict scrutiny.79  As a result, injunctive 
relief was granted to the Plaintiffs because the E.O. 





78 See id. at *15-*17 (outlining Plaintiffs’ claims as including 
a First Amendment challenge, a Fifth Amendment challenge, an 
ultra vires challenge, and a challenge to OFAC’s actions under 
the APA; stating that the only claim the Plaintiffs have a 
likelihood of succeeding under is the First Amendment claim). 
79 See id. at *23-*24 (confirming that the speech-related 
activities the Plaintiffs seek to participate in regarding the 
ICC likely qualify as services that are “directly or indirectly 
in benefit” of SDNs and thus the desired speech is likely to be 
prohibited under the Order and the Regulations). 
80 Id. at *29-*30, *39 (enjoining the government from enforcing 
civil penalties on Plaintiffs’ for the specifically presented 
and potentially violative actions).  
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iii.  Historically Used First Amendment Tests That May 
Apply to IEEPA Litigation. 
 
There are three primary standards used for analyzing 
potential First Amendment violations: strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.81  In cases 
regarding IEEPA and the First Amendment, courts are varied in 
application of scrutiny and tests, but strict scrutiny and 
intermediate scrutiny are often used interchangeably and come to 
similar results.82  Content-neutral regulations are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny while content-based regulations are 
subject to strict scrutiny.83  One intermediate scrutiny test 
 
81 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Substantial Government Interest, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA (2019) https://www.mtsu.edu/first-
amendment/article/1615 (explaining that under strict scrutiny 
the substantial-government must have an extremely important -
interest, intermediate scrutiny requires a slightly lesser 
“substantial interest,” and rational basis a more lenient 
“legitimate interest” must be established).  
82 Cf. Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121, 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *30, *29 n.7 (applying strict 
scrutiny to the First Amendment challenge but that intermediate 
scrutiny would reach the same result).  




related to IEEPA was used in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno.84 
In Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno the court applied four 
questions: (1) is the regulation with the power of the 
government, (2) does it promote an important or substantial 
government interest, (3) is that interest related to suppressing 
free expression, and (4) is the incidental restriction on First 
Amendment freedoms no greater than necessary?85  There also 
exists a final balancing test commonly used that requires the 
court to consider the effect of granting or denying relief to 
each party with particular attention paid to the public 
consequences of granting or denying the relief.86   
 
requires legitimate interest, intermediate requires substantial 
interest, and strict requires a compelling interest).  
84 Cf. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (applying an element test to cases of First Amendment 
challenges where intermediate scrutiny is necessary). 
85 See id. at 1136 (holding in favor of the government and that 
all questions were answered in the affirmative). 
86 See 725 Eatery Corp. v. N.Y.C., 408 F. Supp. 3d 424, 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019)) (explaining that courts must balance competing 
claims of injury between parties, but in cases where the 
government is a party the public’s interest becomes the 






A. The Scope of Power IEEPA has Granted is Overly Broad 
Because It Goes Beyond What Congress Intended When 
Drafting the Statute. 
 
The scope of power IEEPA has inadvertently granted the 
President runs afoul of IEEPA’s intended purpose of constraining 
the President’s power and increasing Congressional oversight.87  
The purpose for using IEEPA to amend TWEA was to constrain the 
power of the President with congressional review and place a 
limit on the over-exuberant use of sanctions, but the result has 
expanded presidential power and severely limited congressional 
oversight.88  The first sanctions regime put into place under 
IEEPA is still in effect today, over forty years after its 
inception, and since 1997 consists of a comprehensive sanction 
 
87 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 2 (1977) (stating the purpose of 
IEEPA was to limit the President’s powers and subject those 
powers to stricter oversight mechanisms). 
88 See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R. 
7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (imploring Congress to adopt the 
amendments to TWEA because the statute granted the President 
“dictatorial powers” to be used without constraint of Congress). 
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regime against the entire country of Iran.89  The long-term 
existence of these sanctions directly contradicts the original 
belief that IEEPA should be used to authorize controls in times 
of national emergency, but should not be used to isolate the 
people of the United States from another country long-term.90  In 
some instances it is clear that Congress agrees with the 
direction of the President’s IEEPA sanctions because they codify 
the declaration with legislation, but in other instances it is 
unclear if Congress’s lack of action is assent, indifference, or 
something else.91   
 
89 See Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to 
Iran, 85 Fed. Reg. 72895, 72895 (Nov. 12, 2020) (affirming 
continuation of the national emergency declared on Nov. 14, 1979 
for the forty-first time), see also Exec. Order No. 13059, 62 
Fed. Reg. 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997) (prohibiting the import or 
export of any goods originating in or destined for Iran). 
90 See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R. 
7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, supra 
note 79 at 10 (maintaining that the long-term use of total 
sanctions is an unwise foreign policy and that enforcement of 
such regulations can allow First Amendment infringements). 





i. IEEPA’s Breadth of Power Must Be Limited Because 
It Currently Permits the President to 
Unreasonably Limit First Amendment Freedoms. 
 
IEEPA was meant to preserve constitutional freedoms and 
preclude policies that would entirely isolate the United States 
from people in other countries.92  The result of sanctions 
regimes created under IEEPA has been the opposite: substantially 
isolating the United States from specific persons, countries, or 
organizations designated under IEEPA and infringing on U.S. 
Persons’ First Amendment rights in the process.93 
 
172, 110 Stat 1541 (1996) (legislating, by Congressional vote, 
the imposition of sanctions on certain actors in Iran and Libya 
for their efforts in obtaining weapons of mass destruction); see 
also Exec. Order No. 12959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995) 
(authorizing sanctions against Iran as a result of actions seen 
as a threat to United States national security). 
92 See Report of the Committee on International Relations on H.R. 
7738 at 15-16 (1977) (representing The Committee’s belief that 
the First Amendment provides adequate protection for free 
speech, and the new statute would not impede that right). 
93 See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121, 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405 at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021) 




The isolation caused by sanctions is – to an extent – the 
intended purpose of IEEPA: this temporary isolation is used as a 
bargaining tool by the United States Government to implore the 
sanctioned parties to cease the actions that gave rise to the 
sanctions.94  That purpose is suitable for short-term sanctions 
but when individuals, countries, and organizations are 
sanctioned long-term or without sufficient deliberation, there 
is little if any political power left to the sanctions as they 
become the status quo.95  The intended use of these emergencies 
was meant to be - by their nature – rare, brief, and declared 
only when there was a real emergency present, but the reality of 
 
were impacted when they were precluded from supporting the ICC). 
94 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Preface to the Second Edition of 
International Economic Law, at 850 (2d ed. 2008) (describing 
economic sanction as “economic controls for political ends” that 
express the issuing State’s disapproval in an effort to change 
the sanctioned parties political or economic practice). 
95 See e.g., Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect 
to Iran, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,895, 72,895 (Nov. 12, 2020) 
(reaffirming sanctions for the thirty-ninth consecutive year 
because the “situation” that gave rise to the emergency is still 
impacting the United States). 
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IEEPA national emergencies has strayed far from that intention.96  
For example, the sanctions promulgated against TikTok in 2020 
were enacted in a political climate that made it unclear if the 
motivation was personal to the President or actually in the best 
interest of national security.97  By utilizing the magic words 
and claiming there was a “unique and extraordinary threat,” the 
President has the power to promulgate sanctions against almost 
any party with minimal oversight outside of the statutory 
exemptions included in IEEPA.98  With the current authority the 
 
96 See Report of the Committee on international Relations on HR 
7738 at 10 (emphasizing that emergencies are rare and should not 
be equated with normal problems experienced); but see 
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 85 Fed. Reg. 
72,897, 72,897 (Nov. 12, 2020) (continuing a national emergency 
first implemented in 1994 for its sixteenth consecutive year). 
97 Contra Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 
2020) (claiming that the data collected via the TikTok app 
threatened to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to 
Americans’ personal information and track Federal employees). 
98 See 50 U.S.C. §1702(b)(1)-(4) (excepting from the Presidents 




President holds under IEEPA, sanctions regimes can be 
commonplace and grant the President unilateral power to enact 
sanctions with minimal justification or accountability before 
they go into effect.99   
The consequences for violating any IEEPA sanctions are 
high: when a U.S. Person makes the business decision to deal 
with sanctioned individuals, they run the risk of racking up 
hundreds of millions of dollars in strict liability fines or 
even jail time.100  In some instances this is logical: if a 
 
include the transfer of value, donations of certain kinds 
(unless the President determines they are necessary), 
importation and exportation of informational materials, and 
transactions incident to travel). 
99 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2021) (excepting proposed rules 
involving “foreign affairs” or “military” functions of the 
United States from the note and comment process generally 
mandated under the APA).  
100 See e.g. BNP Paribas SA Settles Potential Civil Liability for 
Apparent Violations of Multiple Sanctions Programs 1, 1 (June 
30, 2014) 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20140630_bnp.pdf 




corporation subject to United States jurisdiction sells items to 
a sanctioned country or a person who is known to be dangerous, 
it is justifiable that the corporation should be held liable for 
this action.101  Such dealings undermine the aforementioned 
negotiating power of the United States government and jeopardize 
the legitimate government interests in compelling dangerous 
actors to cease the activities that threaten U.S. national 
security.102  Conversely, when U.S. Persons are seeking to 
 
agreed to pay $963,619,900 for violations with a statutory civil 
penalty maximum of $19,272,380,006); see also Inflation 
Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties, supra note 50 
(announcing adjusted civil penalty for IEEPA sanctions to be a 
maximum of $311,532). 
101 See e.g., OFAC Settles with Amazon.com, Inc. with Respect to 
Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of Multiple 
Sanctions Programs 1,3 (July 8, 2020) 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20200708_amazon.pdf 
(announcing that Amazon violated multiple sanctions regimes and 
fulfilled orders for persons on the SDN List at the time of the 
orders; settling for a monetary penalty of $134,523 when the 
maximum statutory penalty was $1,038,206,212). 




support an internationally recognized justice organization or 
utilize a social media app, this liability is unreasonable to 
extend because there is a risk that there is no legitimate 
government interest in seeking to prohibit the actions of the 
sanctioned party.103  Because all existing constraints on IEEPA 
are limitations on OFAC’s enforcement, it is often unclear to 
the individual parties whether their actions will constitute a 








economic sanctions are utilized by powerful governments to exert 
control over other countries’ actions).  
103 See e.g., TikTok v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 232977, at *42 (D.D.C. Dec. 07, 2020) (concluding that the 
Government violated the APA by preventing a company from 
operating in the United States without considering other methods 
for resolving the purported national security interest).  
104 See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 
20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *28 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 
04, 2021) (recounting the government’s argument that the E.O. 
did not limit support for other ICC offices without giving a 
clear indication of what actions would give rise to liability).  
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ii. Current Use of IEEPA Violates the Purpose of the 
Berman Amendment Because the President May 
Unconstitutionally Limit Protected Speech. 
 
The motivation behind the enactment of the Berman Amendment 
is simultaneously limited and exceptionally broad, but there is 
a consensus that the Amendment was meant to provide an 
additional layer of statutory protection to preserve First 
Amendment rights.105  While the text of the Berman Amendment 
applies to informational materials, the vision of Congress in 
protecting First Amendment rights extends beyond a strict view 
of informational materials.106  The logical reading of the 
limited legislative history at hand implies that Congress 
intended to protect all materials implicating the First 
 
105 See Cerunda v. Heavy, 720 F. Supp. 1544, 1547-48 (S.D. Fla. 
1989) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113) (indicating 
that the Berman Amendment was enacted to codify the ABA’s 
resolution regarding First Amendment protections of imports and 
applying the concept to exports as well, but noting that nothing 
further is stated as legislative history). 
106 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-482, at 239 (1994) (Conf. Rep) (positing 
that no actions may directly or indirectly limit the import or 
export of information protected by the First Amendment). 
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Amendment.107  Narrower readings of the Berman Amendment - often 
proffered by the government in court - to construe informational 
materials narrowly have been rejected.108  Instead, it is 
concluded that Congress’s explicit indication that the Berman 
Amendment was to protect First Amendment activities negates the 
fact that reference to the First Amendment was excluded from the 
text of the amendment.109  As such, continued infringement on 
First Amendment rights necessarily violates the purpose 
 
107 See Cerunda 720 F. Supp. at 1550 (rejecting the government’s 
narrow reading of the Berman Amendment and criticizing their 
argument that Congress intended limited First Amendment 
protection by using the phrase “informational materials”). 
108 See id. at 1550, n. 10 (concluding that Congress’s intent in 
enacting the Berman Amendment was to protect any information 
covered by the First Amendment). 
109 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113 (1987) (referencing the 
A.B.A resolution as the purpose for creating the Berman 
Amendment legislation); see also Report No. 1 of the Section of 
Administrative Law, 110 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 467, 517-18 (1985) 
(averring that actions protected by the First Amendment, such as 
scientific work products and other educational material, must be 
protected from the President’s sanction power).  
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underlying the Berman Amendment.110 
Within the legislative history of the Berman Amendment, the 
primary purpose for the legislation is to codify the resolution 
adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates with 
a similar recommendation, as such the House of Delegates 
Resolution is intrinsically tied to the legislative purpose 
behind the Berman Amendment.111  As the report preceding the 
adoption of the Resolution states, Government actions that run 
the risk of chilling Constitutionally protected activity should 
be viewed with scrutiny.112  The conclusion of the report states 
 
110 See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 
20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *31 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 
04, 2021) (holding that should OFAC attempt to enforce sanctions 
against the academics’ work products, the Berman Amendment would 
protect them because their work was necessarily informational). 
111 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 3, at 113 (1987) (articulating, 
in the only indication of purpose within the document, that the 
mission of the amendment was to codify the resolution adopted by 
the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1985).  
112 See Report No. 1 of the Section of Administrative Law, 110 
ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 467, 517-18 (1985) (arguing that actions 




that removing the restrictions on First Amendment protected 
information would strengthen our constitutional system, and 
implores Congress to adopt the recommendations that were 
ultimately legislated in the Berman Amendment.113  With this 
purpose in mind, it is clear that the current usage of IEEPA – 
even with the inclusion of the Berman Amendment – has 
disregarded the noble purpose of free flowing information in 
favor of restricting a plethora of activities that would make 
for a more fully informed and sophisticated citizenry.114  For 
example, the restrictions created by E.O. 13928 and the 
sanctions against the ICC directly contradicted this purpose by 
limiting the free flow of legal scholars’ expertise to an 
internationally recognized court and, furthermore, limited the 
actions and experiences that law students in American 
 
departure from United States policy and requesting protection of 
this ability from interference by the Government). 
113 See id. at 518 (asserting that protections of American access 
to foreign ideas and people is for the greater good of America 
and its citizens). 
114 See id. (positing that there should be no restrictions on the 
import of information that may be lawfully circulated in the 
United States to allow for broader education and expansion of 
knowledge of United States citizens). 
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universities could take in the course of their studies.115   
While courts have begun to realize that the Berman 
Amendment and informational materials exceptions reach far 
beyond the typical conceptualization of informational materials, 
the path to recourse on the matter is still unnecessarily 
strenuous.116  Presidents operate with the belief that IEEPA 
grants them unlimited power in promulgating these restrictions 
and thus the Berman Amendment’s purpose is being repeatedly and 
blatantly violated by the Commander-in-Chief whose 
responsibility is to protect American safety, not to infringe on 
 
115 See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 405, at *12-*13 (asserting that the sanction on the 
ICC caused a Professor of Law at the Cleveland-Marshall College 
of Law to abandon plans to supervise student research that would 
have been provided to the Office of the Prosecutor and thus 
potentially expose the professor to liability). 
116 See e.g., TikTok v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 232977, at *5, *44 (D.D.C., Dec. 04, 2020) (agreeing with 
Plaintiff’s argument that the sanctions promulgated against a 
short-loop video sharing app indirectly regulated the exchange 
of informational materials). 
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constitutional rights.117  Thus, courts’ logic in finding that 
the Berman Amendment extends to technologies such as TikTok must 
also be extended to protect individuals who are subject to non-
geographically specific sanctions.118  A plain reading of the 
text is insufficient in instances of non-geographically-specific 
sanctions akin to the ICC regime.119  Using the ICC case as an 
illustrative example, protection of materials flowing to the 
Netherlands – as the seat of the ICC – are irrelevant because 
the sanctions apply to a multi-national organization and are 
 
117 See e.g., Trump Twitter Archive, 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/ (type “try looking” into the 
search bar) (claiming that he has the right to limit all 
business that the United States conducts with Peoples’ Republic 
of China because of IEEPA’s power). 
118 See Marland v. Trump, No. 20-4597, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
202572, at *25 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 20, 2020) (holding that 
sanctions effectively banning TikTok would prevent the exchange 
of informational material because the videos on the app 
constitute informational materials). 
119 See E.O. 13928, supra note 8 (declaring a national emergency 
with respect to the ICC – an organization - and stating that 
individuals involved in supporting the organization would be 
designated to the SDN List). 
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targeted at individuals regardless of their location.120  This is 
an instance where the courts must use their interpretation power 
to maintain the purpose and relevance of the Berman Amendment to 
protect First Amendment rights.121   
 
B. When Presented with Relevant Cases, The Judiciary Must 
Utilize Interpretation Power to Curtail First 
Amendment Violations Because Congress’s Oversight 
Function is Limited. 
 
Although Congress intended for IEEPA to contain more direct 
oversight than TWEA did previously, as a result of Supreme Court 
decisions handed down after the inception of IEEPA, Congress 
must pass a veto-proof joint resolution as opposed to the 
originally intended legislative veto.122  Congress has never 
repealed an IEEPA sanction regime or even introduced a 
 
120 Cf. Press Release, ICC, The Registrar Inaugurates the ICC 
Field Office in Bangui (Oct. 18, 2007) (listing several field 
offices active at the time including operations in Uganda, Chad, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).  
121 Cf. Marland v. Trump, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 202572, at *24 
(extending Berman Amendment informational materials protections 
to the exchange of technology created on an application). 
122 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that a 
veto provision is unconstitutional because it allows for one 
House of Congress to invalidate decisions of the Executive). 
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resolution to attempt this, which leaves open the question of 
whether the necessity of obtaining a veto-proof majority is too 
high for Congresspeople to consider, or whether the current use 
of IEEPA has represented Congress’s wishes thus far.123  Courts 
historically abide by the latter reasoning and construe 
Congress’s lack of action as indication that they are satisfied 
with the course of action the President is taking with the IEEPA 
sanctions.124  While this is a legitimate assumption, the reality 
is that it is significantly more difficult for Congress to 
repeal an IEEPA sanction regime than it is for a court to 
determine the regime is unconstitutional.125  Since Congress is 
 
123 See P.L. 99-93; 99 Stat. 405 (Aug. 16, 1985) (amending the 
NEA as the parent statute of IEEPA in 1985 to require a joint 
resolution, which is subject to the President’s veto, to 
terminate a national emergency declared by the President). 
124 See e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33 
(2010) (stating that the Executive is entitled to high levels of 
deference when courts consider cases of interest to national 
security and foreign affairs). 
125 Cf. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, ET AL., supra note 19 at 46 (identifying 
two resolutions that introduced to attempt a “legislative veto” 




bound to enact a veto-proof resolution, federal courts have a 
responsibility to protect Constitutional rights impacted by the 
over-exuberant use of IEEPA by the President.126   
 
i. Federal Courts Should Follow Reasoning akin to 
Open Society v. Trump Because the Court Correctly 
Reasoned That Some IEEPA Sanctions Regimes 
Impermissibly Violate First Amendment Rights. 
 
The use of IEEPA by President Trump exposed a weakness in 
the oversight mechanisms in IEEPA, and the prior case law around 
the topic only expanded the President’s power by acting in 
overly deferential ways.127  Due to the path prior case law was 
taking, the President may believe that IEEPA acts as a near 
limitless grant of power on matters of foreign trade and policy 
when this would go directly against Congress’s purpose in 
 
resolution succeeded and neither resolution was in reference to 
an IEEPA emergency).  
126 See Sierra Club v Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 865 (asserting that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha made it more difficult 
for Congress to check the President’s use of emergency powers 
than originally intended). 
127 See e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33 
(2010) (stating that the Executive deserves highly deferential 
treatment when courts consider cases of interest to national 
security and foreign affairs). 
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enacting the statute.128  By ruling that the freedom of speech 
for the Plaintiffs in Open Society was more important than the 
government’s interest, the judge opened a small window of 
protection that was not previously enforced by the courts, but 
is invaluable to have.129   
Open Society stands in stark contrast to the other First 
Amendment challenges that held categorically “there is no 
constitutional right to facilitate terrorism.”130  The judge in 
 
128 See e.g., Trump Twitter Archive, 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/ (type “try looking” into the 
search bar) (demonstrating that the President may believe IEEPA 
grants them powers that fall far outside of Congress’s intended 
grant of power only in times of emergency). 
129 See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121, 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *30, *31 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2021) 
(holding that the sanctions on the ICC impose content-based and 
viewpoint-based restrictions on Plaintiffs due to the language 
of the E.O. and thus rejecting the government’s position that 
the E.O. was content neutral on its face). 
130 See Holy Land Foundation for Relief v. Ashcroft, 333 F. 3d 
156, 164 (D.C., 2003) (citing district court proceedings) 




Open Society correctly highlighted that the activities “for the 
benefit” of any persons designated pursuant to an Order is 
overbroad and allowed for infringement on First Amendment 
rights.131  The language indicated as being restrictive of 
actions is included in most declarations of national emergency 
issued under IEEPA and thus the reasoning of the court should 
broadly be applied as a reasonable constraint of presidential 
power by the judiciary.132  This is reconcilable with the narrow 
view taken in other cases because it will not expressly allow 
for dealing with blocked persons, but instead will give 
individuals the opportunity for clarity on what actions will 
expose them to liability.133   
 
challenge because their actions were in direct support of 
terrorist organizations). 
131 See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 405, at *27 (agreeing with Plaintiffs that the language of 
the E.O. sweeps more broadly than necessary and limits actions 
that do not necessarily need to be limited). 
132 See e.g., E.O. 13224, supra note 16 (“any transaction or 
dealings by United States person . . . is prohibited, including 
. . . for the benefit of such persons”). 




Although the court in Open Society ultimately came to the 
correct conclusion, the use of strict scrutiny to reach that 
conclusion was unnecessary.134  The court’s reasoning that speech 
is limited by the E.O. based on the content of that speech is 
not correct on the face of the E.O.135  As recognized in most 
courts, the Executive branch is granted a higher level of 
deference when issues of national security are present.136  In 
 
Dist. LEXIS 405 at *25 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)) (explaining that material support to 
terrorists is regulated by a test of whether the speech imparts 
“specialized knowledge” or only “general unspecialized 
knowledge” on the receiving party).  
134 See id. at *24 (applying strict scrutiny because a person’s 
speech will result in liability if and only if that speech is in 
support of blocked individuals). 
135 Compare id. at *24 (rejecting the argument that the E.O. was 
content neutral and deserved intermediate scrutiny analysis) 
with Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 
394 F.Supp 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C., 2005) (accepting that a freedom of 
speech challenge to OFAC action warrant intermediate scrutiny). 
136 See e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33 




all cases concerning IEEPA E.O.s national security is an 
integral element of the pronouncement of the national emergency 
and the promulgation of the related sanctions.137  Courts should 
not over correct by being overly deferential to allow the 
Executive broader power, but instead must walk a narrow line to 
balance deference to presidential power with constraint of 
incorrectly used presidential power.138  Some occurrences of 
IEEPA challenges will require strict scrutiny when specific 
actions of the plaintiff are being infringed upon to control 
 
deferential treatment when courts consider cases of interest to 
national security and foreign affairs because the Executive 
serves as the primary authority on matters of foreign affairs). 
137 See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 405, at *40 (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi 137 S.Ct. 1843, 
1862 (1985) (recognizing a significant government interest in 
the creation of a sanctions regime, but not as applied to the 
scope of First Amendment infringement). 
138 See e.g., United States v. Lindh, 212 F.Supp 2d 514, 556-57 
(E.D. Va. 2002) (“Conclusive deference, which amounts to 
judicial abstention, is plainly inappropriate. Rather, the 
appropriate deference is to accord substantial or great weight 
to the President's decision”).  
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their political association or speech.139  As the judge noted in 
Open Society, the case would arrive at the same result if tested 
under intermediate scrutiny, and that is the proper standard to 
use when considering the limitations on actions for the benefit 
of a designated individual.140  Applying strict scrutiny to all 
instances of this phrasing would create a slippery slope to 
invalidating many E.O.s and IEEPA sanctions programs that 
legitimately rely, in part, on that language for power.141  
Further, the government has a legitimate interest – in certain 
 
139 Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project at 25-26 (applying 
strict scrutiny to the as-applied challenge to ADEPA because the 
speech Plaintiffs were using was political, but choosing not to 
apply strict scrutiny to the facial challenge because the 
government did not limit all of the pure political speech). 
140 See id. at 36 (reasoning that given the sensitive interest of 
national security and the Government’s interest in preventing 
terrorism, it may be necessary to prohibit the material support 
of these organizations even where the First Amendment right of 
individuals is infringed upon). 
141 See e.g., E.O. 13224, supra note 16 (utilizing the broad 
language of “any services” to provide OFAC with the power to 
designate and prohibit transacting with individuals who commit, 
threaten to commit, or support terrorism).  
 
52 
circumstances – in broadly limiting actions that will result in 
the support of terrorism.142   
 
ii. Federal Courts Should Apply a Modified 
Intermediate Scrutiny Test to IEEPA Cases Because 
of the Unique First Amendment Infringements Posed 
by Unilateral Presidential Power. 
 
It is proper for courts to analyze First Amendment 
challenges regarding IEEPA actions under intermediate scrutiny 
in many instances, but the historically used test is inadequate 
to protect First Amendment rights impacted by IEEPA backed 
sanctions.143  In instances of both intermediate and strict 
scrutiny, a test must be used to determine if the restrictions 
to the freedom of speech are permissible under the First 
Amendment.144 
 
142 See Global Relief Found. Inc., v. O’Neill, 207 F.Supp.2d 779, 
806 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (deciding that in instances where speech 
and non-speech are comingled, the Government’s interest in 
prohibiting the non-speech actions may supersede Plaintiff’s 
interest in not having their speech actions controlled).  
143 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 
(9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that intermediate scrutiny is proper 
for First Amendment challenges when the law is content-neutral). 




While historical tests provide an important baseline, the 
elements are often cyclical or self-fulfilling in nature: the 
first two elements of the Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno test 
are cyclical in nature with the legality of any E.O. under 
IEEPA, and the answer will always be yes.145  If the answer to 
those questions is no, the E.O. will be struck down on grounds 
apart from the First Amendment thus providing no substantial 
constitutional protection for First Amendment rights.146  The 
third element of that test is useful for identifying if the 
regulation is facially unconstitutional, and if the answer is 
 
20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *26 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 
04, 2021) (expressing the strict scrutiny test as requiring the 
government to prove a substantial interest in limiting the 
speech actions), Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified 
FBI Agents, 394 F.Supp 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C., 2005) (enumerating a 
four element test to determine in limitations of free speech are 
minimal enough to pass intermediate scrutiny). 
145 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno at 1135 (“is the 
regulation with the power of the government? Does it promote an 
important or substantial government interests?”). 
146 See 50 U.S.C § 1701(a) (stating that the President has the 
authority to declare a national emergency for any unusual and 
extraordinary threat) (emphasis added)  
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no, that mostly indicates to the Plaintiffs that they should be 
challenging the order under other laws.147  The final question 
regarding necessary infringement on First Amendment Freedoms is 
the primary protection for U.S. persons subject to IEEPA 
sanctions controls and solely ponders if the First Amendment 
restrictions are minimal enough, but this is not sufficient.148  
The balancing test employed by many courts bolsters the final 
element marginally by requesting that the court considers the 
consequences of their actions, but this is again inadequate 
protection for individuals facing potential constitutional 
infringements.149   
 
147 See, Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno at 1135 (“Is [the 
substantial government interest] unrelated to suppressing free 
expression?”).  
148 See e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1135 
(stating that the First Amendment infringements must be “minimal 
enough” to be justified by the government and thus permissible). 
149 See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 405, at *39-40 (noting that the brief for the 
government argues that there is always a significant national 
security and foreign policy interest at stake with sanctions and 
an injunction would interfere with how the President determined 
is best to proceed in the situation).  
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An additional element of protection is necessary in the 
form of adding a fifth question when applying this test to IEEPA 
cases.150  The fifth element should question if there is 
sufficient evidence that the restriction on First Amendment 
rights is necessary to promulgate the purpose underlying the 
regulation.151  This element would be analyzed in much the same 
way as regulations challenged under the APA, with due deference 
given to the enforcing agency and analysis of the stated record 
to determine reasonableness.152  This standard would be used to 
 
150 See Brief for Brennan Center for Justice as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiffs at 22, Open Soc’y for Justice v. Trump, 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405 (claiming that the Executive’s power 
needs to be subject to “exacting judicial scrutiny” from the 
federal courts who have interpretive power). 
151 Cf. e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 405, at *28 (showing that it is significant to 
determine if a restriction prohibits only speech the Government 
believes is necessary to achieve its substantial interest).  
152 See e.g., TikTok v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 232977, at *40 (D.D.C., Dec. 04, 2020) (citing Holy Land, 
333 F.3d at 162) (following the well-established concept that 




maintain a level of deference to the enforcing agency while 
providing an additional layer of protection for constitutional 
rights without overly restricting presidential power granted by 
IEEPA.153  Although the additional question is similar to some 
existing intermediate scrutiny standards, it delineates between 
breadth and necessity of First Amendment infringements.154  This 
question directs courts to consider the necessity of the First 
Amendment infringement for supporting the resolution of the 
underlying national security threat whereas other tests look to 
the quantity of First Amendment infringements to determine 
reasonableness.155   
 
undertake their own fact finding, but instead to review the 
agency’s record for rational conclusions). 
153 Cf. e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33 
(2010) (emphasizing that the Executive is entitled to deference 
when courts consider cases of involving interest in national 
security and foreign affairs). 
154 See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 
(9th Cir. 2000) (necessitating only that the restrictions on 
First Amendment protected language be “no more than necessary”). 
155 See generally id. at 1136 (seeking to determine whether the 




In addition to this new element, courts should employ 
independent fact-finding requirements with regards to the second 
element questioning substantial government interest.156  This 
step will protect plaintiffs from the government’s ability to 
simply point to the so-called magic words used in almost every 
IEEPA E.O. that says there is a substantial government interest 
in the matter, and thus fulfilling the primary requirement of 
previous intermediate scrutiny tests.157  This independent 
studying would necessitate the President have justifiable 
purposes for enacting the national emergency and provide 
judicial oversight to ensure the purpose is valid after the 
fact.158  This would also serve to mitigate the designation of 
 
restrictions but not considering whether the restrictions 
supported the initial purpose underlying the sanctions).  
156 See e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, 148-79 (2008) 
(arguing that judges should employ a level of independence that 
allows them to act fairly).  
157 Cf. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (authorizing the President to utilize 
IEEPA powers when there is an unusual or extraordinary threat 
that provides an interest in protecting the United States).  
158 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the 
Judiciary has the power to review actions taken by the Executive 
and deem them unconstitutional when relevant). 
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individuals and organizations that cannot be proven as a 
substantial threat to the national security of the United 
States.159   
By applying this test, courts will have a more equitable 
balance of First Amendment rights protections while still 
allowing the President to have a broad grant of power under 
IEEPA.160  This test would formally solidify the reasoning used 
in Open Society that protects U.S. Persons’ rights of free 
speech and association from undue infringement when the 
President declares a national emergency under IEEPA, but would 
not overly restrict presidential power granted to the President 
 
159 But see Remarks to the Press, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of 
State (June 11, 2020)(on file with author) (justifying the 
designation of an international human rights attorney because of 
a claim that they are not pursuing real justice and claiming 
that America must take this action in the pursuit of justice). 
160 See e.g., 50 U.S.C. §1702(c) (authorizing judicial review of 
sanctions regimes and records despite reliance on confidential 
information); see also Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 
No. 20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *27 (S.D.N.Y, Jan. 
04, 2021) (holding that when there is no basis to doubt the 
Government’s legitimate interest in sanctions promulgation, the 
Executive will be awarded deference). 
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by IEEPA.161   
The application of this test will not cause all IEEPA cases 
to result in different holdings: for example, this test would 
not modify the result of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. 
United States.162  As to the first question of whether the 
regulation is within the power of the government, IEEPA has been 
upheld on multiple occasions as a constitutional delegation of 
power to the President and the Department of Treasury.163  As to 
the second question of whether there was an important or 
substantial government interest in the regulation, the court 
stated that due to the national security interest at stake, the 
 
161 See e.g., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 405, at *40-*41 (finding that when a balance of 
equities is conducted, the protection of First Amendment rights 
outweighs that of the government but noting that in content-
neutral cases this may garner different results). 
162 See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. United States Dep't 
of the Treasury, 585 F.Supp 1233, 1267 (D. Or., 2008) (holding 
that the challenged law does not unnecessarily punish protected 
free speech or violate the First Amendment). 
163 See e.g., United States v. Dhafir, 461 F.3d 211, 212–13 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (holding that IEEPA constitutes an appropriate 
delegation of congressional authority to the executive). 
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government had a legitimate national security interest in 
limiting the ability to finance terrorist organizations.164  
Regarding the third question of whether the regulation is 
unrelated to suppressing free expression or association, the 
restrictions applied were for the purpose of limiting financial 
support to terrorists above all other purposes and thus there 
was only an incidental restriction of free speech.165  On the 
fourth question of whether the regulation does or does not 
substantially burden protected actions more than is necessary, 
the limitations imposed by the sanctions program in that 
instance did not punish a substantial amount of protected free 
speech.166  On the final, new, question regarding whether the 
incidental restriction is necessary to promote the purpose of 
 
164 See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. United States Dep't 
of the Treasury at 1267 (interpreting the E.O. and related 
legislation as being tailored specifically to the prohibition of 
financing terrorist organizations).  
165 See id. (determining that the restrictions put forth in the 
executive order are content neutral and do not directly infringe 
on First Amendment rights as written). 
166 See id. (finding that the regulation was targeted solely at 
inhibiting individuals from financing terrorist organizations 
which is not a right protected by the First Amendment). 
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the E.O., the incidental restrictions on First Amendment rights 
of speech and association would be justified for the greater 
purpose of stemming assistance to terrorist groups.167 
Conversely, the new question - whether the First Amendment 
restrictions are necessary to promote the purpose of the E.O. - 
would not permit overreaching infringements to First Amendment 
rights akin to those seen in Open Society.168  The addition of 
the fifth question would result in striking down the ICC 
restrictions at least in part: the purpose of the E.O. was to 
dissuade the ICC from investigating the United States’ alleged 
war crimes, but the sanctions impeded speech actions related to 
the advocacy for international rights of children in countries 
 
167 See id. at 1266 (acknowledging that it is possible to conjure 
a hypothetical where known humanitarian aid organizations such 
become designated pursuant to the executive order but stating 
that the mere possibility of this does not make the incidental 
First Amendment restrictions impermissible). 
168 See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121, 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *38-*39 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 04, 2021) 
(finding the Plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm 
as a result of having their First Amendment rights violated). 
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experiencing armed conflicts.169   
It is imperative that when the judiciary acts to constrain 
presidential power it is maintaining neutrality and independence 
as the Constitution requires.170  When the judiciary utilizes 
this proposed test it will not overstep the bounds of neutrality 
or independence because it will simply employ judicial 
interpretation power.171  Throughout the history of the United 
States, the judiciary has created tests to apply in analogous 
situations and promote uniformity in results, this is the 
 
169 Cf. id. at *7 (introducing one of the plaintiffs as a law 
professor at the University of Georgia School of Law who was 
previously trained for the ICC on matters relating to crimes 
against children and children in warzones, but ceased these 
actions because of Bensouda’s designation); see also id. at *22 
(identifying the Government’s interest as exerting leverage over 
the ICC and deterring them prom pursuing investigations).  
170 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the 
Judiciary should uphold Article III and IV of the Constitution 
when reviewing the constitutionality of actions taken by other 
branches of the government). 
171 See e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014) (positing 
that in all cases the Constitution must be interpreted in light 
of the text, purpose, and experience as a nation). 
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same.172   
 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
The best argument for the judiciary utilizing legitimate 
First Amendment interests to restrict unilateral presidential 
powers lies in the fact that the judiciary opened this so-called 
can of worms to begin with.173  Due to the historic actions of 
the court in removing oversight powers from Congress, resulting 
in a broader grant of power to the President, a power vacuum has 
opened that has allowed the President to act without oversight 
in ways that neither Congress nor the judiciary intended.174  
Until Congress opts to pass a resolution to constrain the 
President’s unilateral power in regards to IEEPA without 
 
172 See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (creating the 
first recognized intermediate scrutiny test to determine if the 
state’s actions violated the First Amendment).  
173 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (limiting 
Congress’s oversight of Presidential actions and designating the 
judiciary as the ultimate check on presidential powers).  
174 See Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup of H.R. 
7738 Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (adopting the NEA and IEEPA as a way 
to reform TWEA power that had become overreaching). 
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creating a political battleground, the burden falls to the 
judiciary to reckon with the results of the precedent they 
created.175   
Until the Trump presidency, courts were on a clear trend of 
expanding executive power by holding in favor of the government 
in many cases challenging executive orders.176  While it is 
unclear if this trend will continue, when cases were brought to 
the courts that challenged clearly overreaching unilateral 
declarations, it fell to the judiciary to act in its power as a 
balance to the executive.177  By enforcing a standardized test 
 
175 Cf. Limiting Emergency Powers Act of 2021, H.R. 63, 117th 
Cong. §2(a) (as introduced in the House, Jan. 04, 2021) 
(proposing an amendment to the NEA, and consequentially IEEPA, 
that would force all declared national emergencies to expire 
within thirty days of declaration is no parallel legislation has 
been passed to support the declaration).  
176 Erica Newland, Note, Executive Orders In Court, 124 YALE L.J. 
2026, 2035, 2040 (2015) (reporting that after analyzing 297 
judicial opinions on executive orders, more than 40% ruled in 
favor of the government and thus expanded Executive power).  
177 Cf. Marland v. Trump, No. 20-4597, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 




that will result in analogous holdings across the board on 
similar cases, the judiciary can use its power in the checks-
and-balances system to make it clear to the President that 
infringement on Constitutional rights is not permissible.178   
Further, there is a distinct interest in not over-burdening 
the President in instances of national emergencies and threats 
to national security.179  Creating a statutory limitation on the 
President’s exercise of power in instances of national threats 
may greatly inhibit the President’s ability to protect the 
United States and its assets.180  The presence of the Berman 
 
an app constitutes informational materials by analogizing the 
content to artwork when presented with the novel question). 
178 See Kenneth Lowande and Jon C. Rogowski, Presidential 
Unilateral Power at 5 (hypothesizing that strategic Presidents 
will see the pattern judicial and congressional oversight is 
taking and tailor their unilateral powers so as to avoid their 
mandates being overturned by the judiciary or by Congress).  
179 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, supra note 19 at 27 (positing that 
IEEPA is a source of authority for the President to quickly 
impose economic sanctions in times of emergency without the 
incumbrance of prior limitations). 




Amendment, discussed above, provides statutory protection to 
individuals by limiting the enforcement of sanctions, but does 
not limit the President’s initial power in promulgating a 
national emergency and IEEPA sanctions program.181  Other 
protections of this kind are provided by OFAC in the form of 
licenses that allow individuals to transact with sanctioned 
parties in ways that may otherwise be construed as impermissible 
under the President’s order.182  As such, the judiciary can work 
 
involving “foreign affairs” from the note and comment process 
generally mandated under the APA thus removing a substantial 
barrier to implementation of rules). 
181 See generally Exec. Order No. 13873,84 Fed. Reg. 22689, 22690 
(acknowledging that the order targeting the ICC would be 
implemented consistent with applicable laws); but see Open Soc’y 
Justice Initiative v. Trump, No. 20Civ.8121, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 405, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 04, 2021) (recognizing the 
government’s argument that the order was enacted with the caveat 
that the IEEPA and Berman Amendment applied, but still stating 
that if OFAC enforced the order against the Plaintiff’s actions 
it would violate the Berman Amendment).  
182 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY FAQ https://home.treasury.gov/policy-




in tandem with the statutory exemptions and OFAC licensing 
structures by enforcing post-enactment constraints on unilateral 
presidential powers through legal challenges.183  This strikes 
the best balance of constraint and grant of power as it protects 
individuals from liability without creating a complex 
bureaucratic process that delays the President from acting in 
instances that require immediate response.184   
The United States also holds a unique power in that the 
 
21, 2021) (defining a general license as a broad allowance for 
any party to conduct transactions that would otherwise be 
prohibited whereas a specific license as written individualized 
and narrow approval to conduct transactions otherwise limited).  
183 Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25 (2010) 
(“concerns of national security and foreign relations do not 
warrant abdication of the judicial role.”). See e.g., 
Publication of Web General Licenses Issued Pursuant to the 
Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 76,450, 76,450 
(Nov. 30, 2020) (issuing General Licenses allowing exports that 
were previously prohibited by E.O.s issued between 2015-2019). 
184 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, supra note 19 at 1 (recognizing 
that IEEPA is a useful tool for the President to quickly 
implement their will or the will of Congress).  
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entire world is wary of U.S. sanctions regimes.185  The penalties 
for violating U.S. sanctions are high and chill a significant 
amount of trade and investment that may be permitted, but 
because it is too close to the line of legality, individuals 
will err on the side of caution to avoid liability.186  While 
this power is a strength for the United States, it must be 
exercised in equitable ways that do not chill, say, support for 
victims of humanitarian violations in Syria.187  Sanctions are 
 
185 See, Aron Lund, Briefing: Just How ‘Smart’ Are Sanctions on 
Syria?, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN (April 25, 2019), 
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2019/04/25/briefing-
just-how-smart-are-sanctions-syria (contending that European 
investors are warier of U.S. sanctions than E.U. sanctions). 
186 See id. (maintaining that although parties in the 
humanitarian sector are exempted from American sanctions, when 
those organizations attempt to deal with banks and other private 
sector actors there is a “chilling effect” caused by the 
existence of a sanctions regime that causes the humanitarian 
organizations to struggle with carrying out their purpose).  
187 See id. (proposing that the United States make better use of 
humanitarian aid exemptions in sanctions regimes to prevent 
further harming the individuals they purport to be advocating 
for with the sanctions regimes). 
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currently the path of least resistance, but they may not always 
be the best option.188  Court’s ability to act as a check on the 
executive is imperative in ensuring that the United States’ 
sanctions regimes do not impermissibly overstep their purpose.189  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Since Congress’s grant of power to the President to impose 
sanctions under IEEPA, those powers have constantly expanded in 
scope.190  When considering the best method the judiciary can 
 
188 See Press Statement, Antony J. Bilken, Secretary of State, 
Ending Sanctions and Visa Restrictions against Personnel of the 
International Criminal Court (April 2, 2021) (on file with 
author) (announcing the revocation of sanctions against the ICC 
and acknowledging that concerns about the ICC’s activities are 
better addressed through engagement with other State parties 
rather than through imposition of sanctions).  
189 See id. (acknowledging that the imposition of sanctions is 
not always the most effective or pertinent way to induce the ICC 
to cease its investigations). 
190 See CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL, supra note 19 at 17-18 (inspecting 
trends in IEEPA sanctions and finding that IEEPA sanctions, on 
average, last longer and are declared for vaguer reasons than 
TWEA’s previous sanctions regimes). 
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take to limit the overbroad reach of this power, the First 
Amendment is the most successfully used Plaintiff’s argument 
against potentially over-reaching sanctions.191  The court in 
Opens Society Justice Initiative v. Trump recognized that the 
broad language used in many E.O.s gives rise to 
unconstitutionally limiting freedom of speech.192  A more 
stringent check on the language and implementation of sanctions 
pursuant to IEEPA can act as an effective balancing against 
executive power to ensure the President is not enacting 
overreaching sanctions that do not promote the purpose of IEEPA 
as a control on terrorism and legitimate national emergencies.193  
 
191 See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, No 20Civ.8121 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *40-41 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 04, 2021) 
(holding in favor of the Plaintiffs to grant injunctive relief 
and enjoin the government from enforcing civil or criminal 
liability against the enumerated activities that Plaintiffs 
believed may give rise to such liability).  
192 See id. at *40-41 (holding that the proffered national 
security justification alone was insufficient in the face of 
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights claims). 
193 See e.g., Trump Twitter Archive, 




As a result of closer inspection of First Amendment restrictions 
imposed by IEEPA sanctions, courts will necessarily need a new 
test to assess the threat.194  This new test must balance the 
legitimate interests of the United States Government in the 
protection of national security and enforcing foreign policy 
with the First Amendment rights of individuals who are directly 
impacted by the promulgation of these sanctions.195  As Congress 
has not created a carveout to IEEPA powers in more than three 
decades, the courts taking this step to constrain presidential 
power assures the protection of First Amendment rights without 
requiring Congress to surmount the difficult task of legislating 
 
search bar) (substantiating the assertion that at least some 
past Presidents believe IEEPA grants them broad powers outside 
the scope of those intended). 
194 See Open Soc’y Justice Initiative v. Trump, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 405, at * 17, 21, 39 (combining multiple elements and 
balancing analyses to come to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s 
First Amendment rights were violated and thus demonstrating a 
potential need for a novel test on this subject). 
195 Cf. id. at *40 (reiterating the necessity of balancing 
legitimate public interests but asserting there is no legitimate 
interest in enforcing unconstitutional laws and actions). 
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modified Executive powers.196  This move to protect 
constitutional rights is one that courts are ready and willing 
to take on, and with this modified test they have the resources 
to enact equitable justice in the face of national security 
concerns. 
 
196 Cf. e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3) (amending IEEPA in 1988 to 
exclude informational materials, the last substantive 
restriction placed on presidential powers under IEEPA). 
